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ABSTRACT 
This article tries to examine ‘wholeness’ and ‘alternation’ in the philosophy of pragmatic 
philosophers and W.E. Hocking. The article tries at the sama time to show the 
emphasis of ‘wholeness’ in these philosophers. So, it investigates ‘the fallacy of 
misplaced concreteness’ of A. N. Whitehead, ‘the principle of alternation’ of 
W.E.Hocking, and ‘wholeness’ with special reference to all these philosophers. 
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PRAGMATİK FİLOZOFLAR VE W. E. HOCKİNG FESEFESİNDE 
BÜTÜNLÜK FİKRİ VE ALTERNASYON (MÜNAVEBE) İLKESİ  
ÖZET 
Bu makale pragmatik filozoflarda ve William Ernest Hocking felsefesinde ‘bütünlük’ ve 
‘alternasyon’u (münavebe) incelemektedir. Makale, aynı zamanda, bu filozoflarda 
‘bütünlük’ vurgusunu göstermeye çalışmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, A. N. Whitehead’in ‘yanlış 
konumlandırılmış somutlaştırma hatası’, W. E. Hocking’in ‘alternasyon ilkesi’ ve bütün 
bu filozoflardaki ‘bütünlük’ vurgusu soruşturulmaktadır. 
Anahtar Sözcükler: Bütünlük fikri, alternasyon (münavebe), yanlış konumlandırılmış 
somutluluk, değer. 
 
This article1 is an analytical investigation (with special reference to the 
principle of alternation and the whole-idea and in the light of process 
philosophy) which based upon the fact that human being is in need of unity 
and wholeness; every branch of the social sciences examines only one different 
aspect of him/her and then should take note of the whole of one’s life and 
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Alternation in the Philosophy of Social Sciences”) which were submitted to International 
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should not claim superiority over other branches. Every branch of (social) 
sciences must be pursued in alternation. 
The life of human being has the wholeness. Separations about human 
being and his/her life, like soul-body, sensation-reflection, fact-value, theory-
practice, reflection-action are the components of wholenenss of human being. 
For investigation of the person, it is necessary to examine these aspects. 
Towards this aim, established disciplines, sciences use their own strategies, 
methods, and technics. 
The problem of this article is that it is a fallacy to think one of these 
aspects with which appropriate branch of discipline or science deal is the 
represantation of wholeness of human being. It would be worse to think this 
situation with respect to every branch of sciences. This is, according to A. N. 
Whitehead, the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. 
For the mental unity, relation, and coherence it is necessary to organise 
sciences. This also stems from wholeness requirement. The idea of wholeness 
is to take into consideration the whole, the parts of which we deal. This idea is 
in constant use but easily ignored because it is regularly what we think with and 
not what we think of. It is the resorvoir of all values. It involves what-is-man-
idea and what-kind-of-a-world-are-we-living-in-idea. This idea is important, 
because it provides a frame for progress and development. To fill in the frame, 
one should turn to the part and deal with it. 
The relation of the part with whole and with the other parts should be 
borne in mind while we deal with sciences. This is according to the principle 
of alternation (of W. E. Hocking). Alternation between whole and part is a qua 
non of this principle. So, neither is anything without the other. 
In this article, as it is predicted, there are two central terms: wholeness 
and alternation. I will discuss these terms with special reference to their two 
dimensions; namely theoretical and practical. 
In theoretical dimension, we will cover three aspects of this matter. 
These are (i) the meaning of philosophy; its implications, its content and 
comprehension, main branches of philosophy. (ii) Philosophical criteira; 
rationality, consistency, objectivity, and comprehensiveness. (iii) The emphasis 
of wholeness in pragmatism. 
In practical dimension, there are a few points which will be examined 
and analysed. These are, for instance, the need of interdisciplinary studies, the 
acute need of the ethics’ of various disciplines, the location of ethics versus 
science in the modern philosophy, the emergency of post-modern situations, 
the understandings of human being unilaterally in each branch of science, the 
implications of modern concept of rationality and so on. 
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Theoretically, philosophy is the study of the nature and meaning of 
existence, reality, knowledge, goodness, beauty etc. From this, it is obvious that 
philosophy has some branches and includes them. They are ontology, 
epistemology, logic, ethics, aesthetics, metaphysics etc. So, philosophy is 
concerned with the problems about these branches. But what makes 
philosophy philosophy is philosophical (qualities) criteria. In other words, 
philosophy is a point of view which includes rationality, consistency, 
objectivity, and comprehensiveness. Then we may not say that every point of 
view is philosophical view. The philosophy of a ‘thing’ (or a ‘sphere’) is 
tantamount to examine the ‘thing’ with respect to the philosophical criteira, 
with special reference to the every branch of philosophy; i.e., epistemology, 
ethics, logic etc. 
Before Renaissance, philosophy had included the sciences. It seems that 
the understanding goes back to Aristotle. Philosophy was the general name of 
scientific knowledge. (The sciences were divided into theoretical sciences and 
practical sciences. Theoretical sciences/knowledge were subdivided into first 
philosophy, physics, and mathematics, and practical sciences/knowledge into 
ethics, politics and etc.).2 And the philosophy had implied the ‘wholeness’ in 
this way or other. In engaging with these sciences or one of these sciences in 
taking its wholeness into consideration was seen as an activitiy of philosophy, 
activity of science, and activity of virtue (wisdom). After the Renaissance, after 
the independence of sciences from philosophy, every science has a philosophy 
or it relies on a philosophy. This means that each science is performed in taking 
note of philosophical criteria and the branches of it. Then every science implies 
the wholeness. ‘Wholeness’ is the result of philosophical criteria, especially 
consistency principle of philosophy. And every science implies especially ethics. 
Ethics is an indispensable branch of philosophy. 
As for the emphasis of wholeness in pragmatism, the idea of wholeness 
is sine qua non of this philosophy. Pragmatism is an American approach to 
philosophy. It is an approach of philosophy. There are three famous 
philosophers whom we may call pragmatists. They are C. S. Pierce, W. James, 
and J. Dewey. They are, at the same time, scientists in the full and technical 
sense of the term. There are also among them Alfred North Whitehead, C. 
Hartshorne, and William Ernest Hocking. 
Pragmatism emphasizes the close relation between theory and practice, 
and between thought and action. 
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The father of pragmatism is C. S. Pierce. He is not only the father of the 
philosophical movement known as pragmatism, but also a logician, a working 
scientist (he spent thirty years actively engaged in scientific research for the US 
Coast Survey) and a mathematician.3 There is a close connection between his 
personal experience of science and his pragmatic philosophy.  
According to him, pragmatism is a philosophical method and a means of 
clarifying ideas. The meaning of intellectual conception consists of practical 
consequences of that conception. All of these consequences constitute the 
whole meaning of the conception.  The practical consequences in question 
refer principally to empirical verification, then the conception should be quitted 
as meaningless if it is not verified.4  
In Peirce’s pragmatism, there exist actual, outer counterparts of our 
thoughts: otherwise, there would be no feasibility of empirical verification of 
our ideas. The appeal to realism is fortified by the accomplishment of the 
empirical sciences which continuously appeal realism in their search for 
patterns of regularity in the universe.5  
W. James, like Pierce, was not only a philosopher; he was also engaged in 
anatomy and physiology. His radical empricism, which may be called his 
pragmatism, consists first of a postulate, next of a statement of fact, and finally 
of a generalized conclusion. This form of empiricism, as different from 
traditional British empiricism, widens the scope of experience to include not 
just individual things but also the relations between those things.6 His emphasis 
on the experience, and the process is concerned with the wholeness. He says 
“the whole man within us is at work when we form our philosophical 
opinions’7, “the entire man, who feels all needs by turns, will take nothing as an 
equivalent for life but the fullness of life itself”8, “we need the whole, and the 
particulars in the whole”.9  
The third main figure of pragmatism is J. Dewey. He is known as an 
American philosopher. But he is also engaged in education, social sciences, 
aesthetics, and political theory and practice. His form of pragmatism is called 
                                                   
3  Potter, Vincent G., “Charles Sanders Pierce”, (in Marcus G. Singer-Ed., American Philosophy), 
Cambridge Univ. Press, Melbourne 1988, p. 21. 
4  Williams, John Reynold, Martin Heidegger’s Philosophy of Religion, Canadian Corporation for 
Studies in Religion, Canada 1977, p. 51. 
5  Williams, ibid., p. 51. 
6  Williams, ibid., p. 54; James, William, Pragmatism, Dover Publications, New York 1995, p. 17. 
7  Jones, Peter, “Wiliam James”, in Marcus G. Singer (Ed.), American Philosophy, Cambridge 
Univ. Press, Melbourn e1988,  p. 48. 
8  Jones, ibid., p. 61. 
9  Jones, ibid., p. 68; James, Pragmatism, p. 49. 
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Instrumentalism. This concept is especially and mainly about operative, active, and 
instrumental functions of knowledge. 
His philosophy tried to overcome many serious divisions within 
experience between self and world, soul and body, nature and God, knower and 
known, experience and nature. His chief goal is to eliminate these divisions. His 
view is that these divisions which is by way of isolation, are not primary and 
irreducible. 
Dewey applied his pragmatic experimentalism to all aspects of human 
activity. According to him, although it is latent, there is an idea that the parts of 
a whole, as in the case of the human organism, are to be examined in the view 
of their relation and contribution to the whole. In addition that there is a 
favored treatment of subject matters as composed of interdependent 
components shaping or guiding to ‘organic unity’, and there is a powerful 
intellectual and emotional ardor for unification.10  
Emphasis of process in pragmatism is very important. But there is at the 
same time a philosophy called process philosophy. The main philosopher of 
process philosophy is A. N. Whitehead. He is also a mathematician, logician and 
a philosopher of science. 
He extended the notion of process to all of reality.11 Whitehead is an 
empiricist like the other pragmatists. But his form of empiricism is called by 
himself “philosophy of Organism”. In his philosophy, all elements of nature, 
including consciousness, are essentially interrelated and the parts of one organic 
whole.12  
Whitehead’s “Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness” is committed when 
one ascribes concrete reality to the object of the abstractive process.13 It is only 
the casual error of mistaking the abstract for the concrete. The fallacy is about 
to accept an abstract belief, opinion, or concept as a physical or concrete reality. 
Some examples of the specific abstractions to which concreteness has been 
assigned are substance, the subject-object dichotomy,14 and the notion of that a 
                                                   
10  Thayer, H.S., “John Dewey”, in Marcus G. Singer (Ed.), American Philosophy, Melbourne: 
Cambridge Uni. Press, p. 71. 
11  Williams, Martin Heidegger’s Philosophy of Religion, p. 63. 
12  Williams, ibid., p. 62. 
13  Whitehead, Alfred North, Science and the Modern World, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge 
1925, p. 58. 
14  Williams, Martin Heidegger’s Philosophy of Religion, p. 61. 
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concrete physical object in the universe can be described simply in a spatial or 
temporal extension.15  
Hocking, who was influenced chiefly by W. James and J. Royce, engaged 
in philosohy and studied civil engineering.16  
Hocking agrees with aforesaid philosophers that there is an organic 
union of idea with feeling. According to him, our idea of the whole is easily 
ignored since it is not what we are thinking of, but it is regularly what we think 
with. However it includes the world-reality and life-reality. His example to 
clarify is that: if we support Jones for President rather than Smith, it is –we say- 
because Jones is the better man. And what is the measure of this value? We 
approve of Jones’ policies; he agrees with our foreign-policy-idea and our what-
is-good-for-America-idea. But such agreement inevitably, although 
unobtrusively, involves our what-is-man-idea and our what-kind-of-a-world-
are-we-living-in-idea.17 In his philosophy our whole-idea is in use constantly 
and is the source of our values.18  
The idea of the wholeness is a working element in our thinking and we 
know only the whole-ness of our experience. Life necessitates a rough 
combining in both our thoughts and our actions. Each of us needs whole-ness 
for our moral integrity.19 Hocking’s idea of whole is closely connected with his 
Principle of Alternation. 
The principle of alternation, so far as daily life is concerned, is not 
unknown. Hocking’s view is that man naturally deals with each of the various 
goods which go to constitute a balanced existence in order as if it were an only 
and adequate object. Man does not attempt to follow them all, or many, 
immediately. Although all good things belong together doubtlessly, each of 
them ought to be pursued separately. But deducing from the parts to the whole 
is difficult. In other words, it is hard to see indispensable alternation between 
whole and the all partial objects. The whole has to become a different object of 
quest, like a part.20  
With this principle, Hocking attempts to overcome old dualisms such as 
soul and body, form and matter, God and world, reflection and action, form 
                                                   
15  Williams, ibid., p. 62. 
16  Gilman, Richard C., “Hocking, William Ernest”, in Paul Edwards (Ed.), The Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, Vol. 4, Macmillan Co., New York 1967, p. 46. 
17  Rouner, Leroy S., Within Human Experience The Philosophy of William Ernest Hocking, Harvard 
Uni. Press, Cambridge, 1969, p. 80. 
18  Hocking, William Ernest, The Meaning of God in Human Experience, Yale University Press, New 
Haven 1950, p. 131. 
19  Rouner, op.cit., p. 70. 
20  Hocking, op.cit., p. 405. 
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and substance. They belong each other but they should be pursued separately 
and in alternation. Because man can not go on both at once, with success. Each 
best finds its adequate effect on the other if each has its time of attention 
cordially. Each have to be obtained in its own way and time, by some degree of 
distinct attention.21  
To follow out this theory, Hocking treats of art, and knowledge. There is 
a difference between technique and the spirit in every art. One cares little for 
one without the other. However man is aware of the fact that technique have to 
be cultivated as if for its sake alone, for it has its own right, and that the spirit 
has its own moment, in the intervals of technical study, and it represents the 
whole.22  In this place the whole alternates with the parts.23  
According to Hocking, the art of obtaining knowledge does not differ 
from other arts in this respect. “We know what the tools for intellectual 
discovery are –facts in infinite variety and extent, measurements, classifications, 
knowledge of all existing theories: he who would win truth must fill himself as 
full as possible of science, of history, of social motives, of the immense richness 
of the cosmos. But we know too that there comes a moment when these very 
things, his necessary means, become his poisons: this is the moment at which 
they become himself. The man becomes identical with his learning, is nothing 
but his learning: he cannot use it because he has lost sight of the thing it is not, 
he has forgotten what it is for. His technique cannot serve him unless he can see 
beyond it. That self must be withdrawn and re-oriented: it must turn its back 
upon itself, and revert to the whole.”24  
This practical requirement is fixed in the very categories of the science. 
One finds the simplest form of alternation in the psychology of ones knowing 
processes in which the whole is one member. Knowing, as a process in time, 
has to work not only between fact and fact, part and part of experience, but 
also between all such parts and some conception of the whole. There is the 
work of hypothesis, the alternation between induction and deduction, beside all 
the work of observation.25 The scientist is engaged in phenomena; but beside 
the phenomena, there should be the concept of substance, as an other object of 
necessary attention, in some form or other (whether of matter, or energy, or 
law, or soul). Any concrete knowledge of a society, a race, an age, etc., should 
be acquired by a similar inteaction of categories: it is necessary to extend  
                                                   
21  Hocking, ibid. p., 406. 
22  Hocking, ibid. p., 407. 
23  Hocking, ibid. p., 408. 
24  Hocking, ibid. p., 408. 
25  Hocking, ibid., p. 408. 
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knowledge, on the one hand, and to deepen on the other; in order to deepen 
there should be an attempt to grasp the ‘spirit’ of things, their principle, 
formula, esence, -in brief, their one, their whole. This procedure is valid for our 
knowlege of individual men. If I wish to know a person, I have to pursue 
acquaintance in two directions: trying to know him in what he does, and trying 
to know him by the pursuit of his central ‘substance’, by the unity from which 
all these plural deeds are derived as well.26  
Hocking says “the knowledge of the greater whole evidently follows the 
same principle as the knowledge of these lesser wholes.”27 Person’s world is 
‘experience’ and ‘life’ at its circumference; it is ‘substance’ and ‘reality’ at its 
center. Person have to know both facets in turn, and understand them as s/he 
can together. His/her total picture of this world is drawn like an artist’s sketch 
–not by a straight line, but by a series of lines which are wrong and broken in 
their course by repeating to the (undrawn) idea.28  
Hocking’s view is that we find the principle of alternation in its full 
meaning, in the history of the will. Because this principle is best seen in this 
history. “In all our practical living we human beings are pursuing some total 
good under shapes and by means which are inadequate to it, and so partly false 
to it. We are obliged from time to time to reject what we have done, to 
withdraw our forward-moving efforts, and revert to the whole: not because of 
the fact of error (for there are errors which may be remedied on the spot 
without change of direction), but because of the type of error, - it is an error 
which involves not only our tools, but our selves, the operators.29 We begin to 
get into our own way and so to defeat our own work. We can find no radical 
remedy except in getting rid of that self; and no radical way of abandoning that 
self except by reverting to the whole.”30  
It goes without saying that the principle of alternation and the wholeness 
idea are the key elements in the philosophy of W. E. Hocking. 
In practical aspect, there are some facts which show the need of 
wholeness and the principle of alteration. Some of them are the location of 
ethics versus science in the modern philosophy, the understandings of human 
being unilaterally in each branch of science, the implications of modern concept 
of rationality, the need of interdisciplinary studies, the acute need of the ethics 
of various disciplines, the appearance of post-modern situations and so on. 
                                                   
26  Hocking, ibid., p. 409. 
27  Hocking, ibid., p. 409. 
28  Hocking, ibid., p. 410. 
29  Hocking, ibid., p. 410. 
30  Hocking, ibid., p. 411. 
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To begin with, as for placing ethics against science, trade, art, civilization 
etc., in the history of philosophy, remember Bernard Mandeville’s The Fable of 
the Bees, which Adam Smith owed much, with its slogan “private vices, public 
benefits.”31  
Although his economic tenets are certainly more thoroughly developed 
than his moral theories, his philosophy has an important outcome against ethics 
and strengthens egoist-hedonist tendencies. Mandeville presented his economic 
doctrines in his moralizing poem, “The Grumbling Hive”. The bees in the 
poem have many vices, however their society is a prosperous one. Mandeville’s 
notion of vice is a threefold one. “First, he has in mind such character traits as 
envy, vanity, love of luxury, and fickleness in diet, furniture, and dress… 
Secondly, Mandeville calls vice that behaviour which is necessary to profitable 
trade… Third, Mandeville counts crime as a vice that provides public benefits. 
Thieves are valuable… Mandeville may therefore conclude, ‘The worst of all 
the Multitude / Did something for the Common Good.”32  
 Secondly, each branch of science which is concerned about human 
being directly or indirectly, examines and explains (developes theories about) 
the human being in its own aspect. This is not unnatural and abnormal. What 
which is unnatural and abnormal is to forget this fact (this limited aspect) and 
to generalize this aspect to all of human being. For example, understanding of 
human being as homo economicus is the only one of the sample of this limited 
standpoint. Because, for instance, human being is not only homo economicus but 
also homo ludens.33 ‘Play’ is accepted as one of the basic human goods in the 
natural law theory of John Finnis whose formulation is one of the main natural 
law theories.34  
Thirdly, modern concept of rationality has some weak points. Two of 
them are divisionism (between, for instance, spirit and matter, self and world, 
soul and body etc.) and reductionism (for example, spirit into matter, soul into 
body etc.). These two elements damage the interconnectedness of life’s basic 
elements and their interrelatedness. This may be due to use of rationality only 
in descriptive sense. But it has prescriptive sense as well. Rationality in the 
                                                   
31  Sprague, Emler, “Mandeville, Bernard”, in Paul Edwards (Ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
Vol. 5, Macmillan Comp., New York 1967, p. 148. 
32  Sprague, ibid., p. 148. 
33  Bauman, Zygmunt, Post Modern Etik, Translated (into Turkish) by., Alev Türker, Ayrıntı Yay, 
İstanbul 1998, p. 207. 
34  Finnis, John, Natural Law and Natural Rights, Oxford University Pres., Oxford 1980, p. 50; 
Türkeri, Mehmet, “Etik Tarihindeki Temel “Doğal Yasa” Anlayışları Ve Bu Anlayışlardaki 
Dini Unsurlar”, Review of The Faculty of Divinity, Published by Divinity Faculty of Dokuz Eylul 
University, Izmir 2005, Vol. 22, No. 22, p. 15. 
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sense of wisdom has this double meaning. But this form of rationality has 
become less and less important especially in the last few centuries. This 
problem may be solved by Aristotle’s understanding of soul. 
Aristotle says “the states by virtue of which the soul possesses truth by 
way of affirmation or denial are five in number, i.e. art, scientific knowledge, 
practical wisdom, philosophic wisdom, intuitive reason.”35 The object of scientific 
knowledge is of necessity.36 Art is concerned with coming into being in variable 
(not necessary) things.37 Practical wisdom is about sorts of thing lead to the good 
life in general.38 Wisdom is intuitive reason integrated with scientific 
knowledge.39  These five states of soul is equally important for the life of 
human being and neither of them is excluded. All of these states are the virtues 
of the rational part of the soul, namely of human being.40  
Finally, the need of interdisciplinary studies, the acute need of the ethics 
of various disciplines, the coming of post-modern situations, global factual 
problems (like global warming, ecological problems, absolute poverty in which 
a fifth of the world’s population lives) etc. which we will not cover here, display 
the need of the standpoint of wholeness and the function of principle of 
alternation in accordance with the principle of relativity. 
Here is some concluding remarks. We should construct our ‘philosophy 
of wholeness’ which relies upon the idea of wholeness. Although easily ignored, 
our whole-idea is in use constantly, and is the source of our values. We have to 
constitute or, say, scrutinize our whole-idea without disregarding every part. We 
should construct whole-idea with the formulation of not ‘either… or’ but 
‘both… and’. For pursuing the whole and the part/s at the same time 
succesfully is very hard, we have to alternate between them and to take into 
consideration the principle of alternation. Every thing has a relation with other 
thing, then we ought to take into account the principle of relativity. 
Human being is a being of value. This is tantamount that s/he is a being 
of morality and ethics. This shows that s/he has a philosophical aspect. (Then, 
it is not right to think human activity without value.). We already know he has 
scientific aspect as well. Then we say that the life of human being contains all 
sorts of activities. These include all science (although some of which concerned 
with inanimate nature), philosophy, literature, art, religions, leading laws, 
                                                   
35  Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in Richard McKeon (Ed.), The Basic Works of Aristotle, 
“Nicomachean Ethics” Translated by, W.D. Ross, Random House, New York 2001, 1139b, 15. 
36  Aristotle, ibid., 1139b, 20. 
37  Aristotle, ibid., 1140a, 5-20. 
38  Aristotle, ibid., 1140a, 25. 
39  Aristotle, ibid., 1141a, 15. 
40  Aristotle, ibid., 1139b, 10. 
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created institutions, the thoughts and acts of individuals, hopes and fears etc. 
We experience life in its whole distinctive complexity, variety and wealth. It 
seems that the experience of man is an energetic and integrated whole in which 
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